

# **Crescent School Model United Nations 2025**

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A Background Guide for:  
**Disarmament and International  
Security Committee**

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## Land Acknowledgement

Crescent School and the staff of CSMUN III acknowledge that we are gathered upon and would like to honour the traditional territory of many nations, including the Mississaugas of the Credit, the Anishnabeg, the Chippewa, the Haudenosaunee, and the Wendat peoples and it is now home to many diverse First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples. We thank them for their stewardship of the land, and we are in solidarity with our Indigenous Brothers and Sisters as we move forward in reconciliation.

Acknowledging the traditional territories of Indigenous peoples is not only a gesture of respect but also a recognition of the historical and ongoing injustices they face. It is a reminder that the impacts of colonization, displacement, and systemic discrimination continue to reverberate today. We would like to take the opportunity to honour the resilience of Indigenous communities and commit to amplifying their voices in our pursuit of justice and equity.

## Equity Disclaimers

In the event that you have concerns about equity, diversity, inclusion, or belonging or are uncomfortable due to the actions of another delegate, chair, co-chair, or staff member of CSMUN III, please reach out to the Equity Team to file your concern. Equity is outlined through the code of conduct listed above. You may reach out to the equity team through an anonymous form, by speaking with your chairs, or by emailing any member of the CSMUN II Secretariat if you feel comfortable doing so. The Equity team can be reached at [csmunequity@crescentschool.org](mailto:csmunequity@crescentschool.org)

**The Equity Form is here to submit any equity concerns ([Equity Form](#)). This can be found also in committee rooms.**

Equity concerns are taken very seriously at CSMUN III. The equity policy of CSMUN III is strict in accordance with the school's Diversity Statement and the Crescent School Constitution, which includes the Crescent School Declaration of Student Rights, and violations outside of reason will not be tolerated. The School's Constitution was prepared in accordance with, and in support of, the Safe Schools Act and corresponding principles in the Education Act, as well as the Human Rights Code. When an equity is filled, the CSMUN III Equity team will step in and take appropriate steps and actions to remedy the situation. CSMUN III is committed to ensuring that everyone is valued with respect, responsibility, honesty, and compassion. We are committed to pursuing disciplinary action as stated above if needed to facilitate a positive and safe environment.

## **Tech Policy**

Please note that some form of Smart Device is required to participate in CSMUN III. While we are a paper conference (with the exception of crisis committees), delegates will need to use their computers to write and work during the unmods. Communications with delegates, the dias or other staff can be done either via paper notes or email.

Delegates at CSMUN are expected to utilize technology responsibly and ethically throughout the conference. While the use of smart devices, computers, and digital tools is necessary for research, writing, and collaboration, delegates are prohibited from utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) systems or automated tools to gain an unfair advantage or manipulate conference proceedings. Pre-writing resolutions outside of unmods and using AI to write resolutions and working papers is also prohibited. Delegates must also refrain from engaging in any illegal activities, including but not limited to hacking, piracy, or the distribution of harmful content to anyone in or outside of the conference.

# Letter from the Secretary-General

*A Letter from the Secretaries General and Deputy Secretary General of CSMUN III*

Dear Delegates and Faculty Advisors,

Welcome to the third iteration of the Crescent School Model United Nations conference! Thanks to your support, our inaugural conference in April 2024 was a tremendous success, and CSMUN II built on that momentum with even greater participation and enthusiasm. We are now thrilled to invite you to CSMUN III, taking place on December 13–14, 2025, at Crescent School in Toronto.

Since our last conference, the Crescent MUN team has continued to grow in both size and passion. We've welcomed new members, explored fresh ideas, and remained committed to fostering a vibrant environment where students can engage with global affairs, diplomacy, and debate. We're excited to share this passion with you once again.

CSMUN III will feature a dynamic range of committee simulations, including but not limited to DISEC, WHO, the Canadian House of Commons, and an Ad Hoc, along with a special networking event. Delegates can look forward to rigorous debate, thought-provoking dialogue, and the opportunity to connect with peers from across the region and beyond. Registration for CSMUN III is now open! We encourage all interested delegates and faculty advisors to explore our website for full details and to secure your place at the conference. Please note that registration will close on December 10, 2025.

To stay updated on all things CSMUN, be sure to follow us on Instagram at [@cs.modelun](#). If you have any questions or need assistance, don't hesitate to reach out to us at [modelun@crescentschool.org](mailto:modelun@crescentschool.org). Our team is here to support you every step of the way.

Thank you for considering attending CSMUN III. We can't wait to welcome you to Crescent School for what promises to be our most exciting conference yet.

Sincerely,

Deren Terzioglu & Gregory Mavroudis | Secretaries-General of CSMUN III  
Joel Green | Deputy Secretary-General of CSMUN III  
Crescent School Model United Nations 2025

## **A letter from Dais**

### **A Letter from the Chair**

*Dear Delegates,*

Welcome to the Disarmament & International Security Committee! Thank you for choosing to be a part of the best committee in CSMUN III. My name is Thomas Cai, and I am extremely excited to be your director this year!

I am a grade 10 student at Crescent School. I have been participating in MUN since I was in grade 8. Competing in various conferences, MUN has become one of my favourite activities outside of school. The best thing about MUN for me is the ability to network with all types of people. I met some of my favourite people through MUN. I hope this conference gives you the change to meet new people who will shape your journey as well. Conferences can also be like roller coasters; you have times when people laugh together, and then you have times when there's not enough space for the Author's panel. However, the most important part of this committee is enjoying the experience.

DISEC is arguably the most influential General Assembly within the United Nations.. DISEC is often seen as a beginner committee, but it deals with heavy issues and can require critical thinking for more creative solutions.

As you prepare, please treat this background guide as what it is, in no way should this be your main source of information. I encourage all delegates to take the tie to explore and question your country's stances and conduct your research.

Lastly, I want everyone to gain something more than just an experience or an award from this committee to put down on a resume. I want the delegates in DISEC to feel the passion and joy of delegating, communicating, and collaborating with others. The best way to do that would be to raise that placard for speeches or try to have an opinion during unmods. Don't be afraid to fail, and try to be creative and think of some new solutions to these long-standing issues. Feel free to contact me if you have any questions at [thomascai25@crescentschool.org](mailto:thomascai25@crescentschool.org).

Best of luck, and I look forward to seeing you in Committee!

Thomas Cai | Chair of CSMUN III: DISEC

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Part 1

## **Introduction to the Problem**

### **Global Arms Trade, Diversion, and Transparency**

The militarization of space has become a pressing concern in recent years, as major powers like the United States, China, and Russia have increasingly weaponized and turned space into a domain to prove political and economic power. This space transformation into a military and political domain poses significant threats and risks to global security. According to the Defense Space Strategy, space is recognized as a unique domain of national military power, and its militarization is aimed at ensuring space superiority to secure vital national interests. Major players in the space industry, both government-run space agencies and private companies, compete not only for prestige but also for strategic advantages, economic benefits, and potential resources. The militarization of space goes beyond economic opportunities and competition. Space assets, such as satellites, have become critical for military capabilities, including surveillance, communication, and navigation, making them vulnerable targets in conflict. Anti-satellite tests and the creation of space debris have raised concerns about the weaponization of space and the potentially destabilizing effects of such actions. In addition, efforts to address the militarization of space and prevent the weaponization of outer space have encountered challenges. The distinction between militarization and weaponization has failed, as the normalization of militarization has encouraged weaponization and other harmful activities. The lack of clear international regulations governing space activities and the ambiguity surrounding lunar resource rights have further fueled tensions. To prevent further escalation, there is a need for international cooperation, transparency, and the development of norms and agreements to govern behaviour in space. Efforts should focus on preventing an arms race in outer space, promoting responsible behaviour, and pursuing unilateral arms control measures to de-escalate militarization and arms racing.

## **Emerging Military Technologies and International Humanitarian Law**

Chemical Warfare is the use of toxic chemical substances to inflict casualties or incapacitate enemy forces. These substances can be delivered through various means, including bombs, artillery shells, and aerial sprays. The effects of chemical weapons can range from immediate death to long-term health problems. The history of chemical warfare dates back to ancient times when poisonous substances were used in warfare. However, the modern era of chemical warfare began during World War I, when chlorine gas was first used on the battlefield. Since then, chemical weapons have been used in numerous conflicts around the world, including the Iran-Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War. Given history, the use of chemical weapons is widely condemned by the international community. Several international treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, have been signed to prohibit the development, production, and use of these weapons. Despite these efforts, the threat of chemical warfare remains a concern for human rights protection.



## Part 2

# Topic A: Global Arms Trade, Diversion, and Transparency

### Current Situation:

On a global scale, the global arms trade operates within a complex web of international laws, treaties, and arms cooperation, accompanied by national regulations. While these frameworks were designed to prevent tensions by promoting responsible weapon transfers, significant gaps still undermine their effectiveness across political, ethical, and economic fields. Inconsistent enforcement, limited transparency, and countries competing in an arms race create an environment where weapons can easily be used negatively in illicit markets and conflict zones. The section below outlines key challenges that continue to hinder global engagement and the misuse of global arms, issues delegates may consider to form resolutions.

### Weak Enforcement of International Law

One of the main legal challenges surrounding the global arms trade is that international laws are not always enforced equally. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came into effect in 2014, was created to make countries more responsible in how they sell and transfer weapons. However, not every state has ratified it, and even among those that have, some lack the systems or resources to enforce it properly. This inconsistency allows arms to move into regions where they are used in human rights abuses or ongoing conflicts. Without having more suitable penalties for violations, many exporters continue to operate without transparency or accountability.

### Diversion of Legal Weapons

Another major issue is diversion, which happens when weapons that were legally sold end up in the hands of unauthorized groups, like militias or criminal organizations. This often occurs through corruption, theft, or weak control over stockpiles. While exporting countries are supposed to check who will use their weapons, there are few global standards for tracking arms once they've been delivered. As a result, many weapons are resold or stolen and used in conflicts that the original exporters never intended to support.

### Lack of Transparency and Reporting

Transparency is one of the biggest gaps in the current arms trade system. Under the ATT, countries are expected to report every year on what weapons they export or import. In practice, many reports are incomplete or not submitted at all. Some states cite national security as a reason to withhold data, while others simply lack the capacity to collect accurate information. Since there is no global body that verifies the reports, it is difficult to know how many weapons are actually being transferred or where they end up.

### **Sovereignty and Monitoring**

There is also tension between state sovereignty and international monitoring. Every country has its own sovereignty, but that can conflict with international rules that limit where and how weapons can be sold. When countries prioritize national interests or alliances, they often bypass restrictions designed to prevent escalation or human rights violations. This makes it difficult to hold them legally responsible, since arms deals are often justified as a matter of national security.

### **Corruption and Limited Accountability**

Corruption is another serious concern. Corruption in the form of bribes, fake end-user certificates, and unregulated brokers allows weapons to enter black markets or reach sanctioned groups, or groups that aren't allowed to possess this unregulated amount of arms. While international laws such as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) address corruption in general, there are few legal tools focused specifically on the arms industry. In many cases, companies or officials involved in illegal transfers face little or no punishment because their actions occur across multiple jurisdictions.

### **Gaps in Global Legal Frameworks**

Finally, there is no single, collective law that oversees all aspects of the arms trade. The ATT provides a foundation, but it proves to be ineffective. Other regional agreements, like the EU Common Position on Arms Exports or the ECOWAS Convention in West Africa, address specific areas but don't apply globally. Because of this, definitions and regulations vary between countries, making enforcement difficult and leaving loopholes that traffickers and corrupt actors can exploit.

## **Legal Issues**

### **Violations of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)**

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came into effect in 2014, was created to make countries more responsible in how they sell and transfer weapons. However, not every state has ratified it, and even among those that have, some lack the systems or resources to enforce it properly. For example, all countries are required to submit mandated annual reports as part of Article 13 of the ATT, such as conducting risk assessments before exporting weapons, though many fail to do so. This inconsistency allows arms to move into regions where they are used in human rights abuses or ongoing conflicts. Without having more suitable penalties for violations, many arms exporters continue to operate without transparency or accountability, fueling weapon-backed disputes, corruption, and global insecurity, underscoring the importance of compliance.

### **Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)**

The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules designed, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects individuals who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities, such as civilians, medical personnel, and prisoners of war, and restricts the methods and means of warfare to prevent misuse. While the Geneva Conventions established the IHL as a framework that countries are legally obliged to follow, one of the main challenges in the global arms trade today is that countries often fail to comply with these laws. This undermines the elevated risk of weakened global coordination, higher civilian casualties, and making it difficult for violators to be held responsible when they incentivize weapons as a main tool in triumph. In short, even legally exported weapons can contribute to violence and human suffering if the IHL is not enforced consistently.

### **Diversion of Legal Weapons**

Even when arms are sold legally and securely under international laws between countries, they can end up in the hands of unauthorized entities, such as militias, insurgents, designated terrorist groups, or other criminal organizations. This diversion, without cautious exercise, often results in corruption, theft, violence, fraud, and a loss of autonomous control over a region. Exporting countries are expected to assess the risk of diversion as highlighted in the ATT and monitor where these weapons go as a potential effort to mitigate risks associated with the diversion of legal weapons. As a result, legally-exported arms can be resold, stolen, or misused in conflicts illicitly, contributing to human rights abuses and destabilizing regions without legal enforcement, not only globally, but domestically through revitalized guidelines.

## **Case Study I: The Sahel Region and the Diversion of State-Supplied Weapons**

The Sahel region, which includes smaller countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and surrounding states, has become one of the most prominent and significant examples of how weak enforcement, paired with corruption and limited transparency or accountability in the global arms trade can directly fuel regional instability. Over the last decade, an increase in conflict between extremist groups, insurgent militias, and state forces has intensified the demand for weapons and arms supply. But at the same time, gaps in international monitoring and oversight have allowed legally imported or donated weapons to be consistently diverted and released into illicit markets.

A major factor in the Sahel crisis is the inability of states to track and control their stockpiles. Many governments in the region rely heavily on international arms transfers to support and maintain their security sectors. That includes shipments of rifles, ammunition, armoured vehicles, and military communication systems. And although such transfers are intended for legitimate defence purposes, weak storage systems, insufficient record keeping and accountability, and corruption among government officials have resulted in thousands of weapons being lost, stolen, damaged, or deliberately transferred to unauthorized groups. Investigations by the UN and various research groups have shown that small arms that are provided to state militaries frequently reappear in the hands of different militias or extremist movements, for example, the ISIS (Islamic State) in the Greater Sahara and Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin. The Sahel case shows that legal transfers can still undermine regional security if exporting and importing states fail to comply with the ATT risk assessment process, maintain transparent records, or report their exports consistently under Article 13, which promotes reports and accountability measures to report to the Secretariat or different states.

## **Case Study II: The Yemen Conflict and Arms Transfers to the Saudi-Led Coalition**

The conflict in Yemen remains one of the clearest examples of how weak global arms trade regulations, limited transparency, and poor enforcement can directly intensify a humanitarian crisis. Since 2015, a Saudi-led coalition has launched large scale military campaigns with imported fighter jets, precision guided bombs, armoured vehicles as well as other weapons supplied by major exporters like the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. Although these transfers were legal, it's application in Yemen was highly questionable in terms of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

During the war, UN investigations and human rights groups have reported the consistent use of airstrikes on civilian infrastructure such as schools, markets, water facilities, funerals and hospitals. The cases cast doubts regarding breaches of the principles of distinction and proportionality. Even as the cases of civilian casualties kept on increasing, numerous exporting states kept on with the shipments at the expense of economic or security alliances, rather than the need to address humanitarian concerns.

Under Article 6 and 7 of the ATT, the states should refuse or withhold exports when it is evident that the weapons transferred to a state may be used in committing a grave violation of IHL. Nevertheless, the Yemen conflict shows that the assessment of risks is usually politicized. As an example, the United Kingdom and France granted export licences as the evidence was piling up on civilian casualties. Canada was also criticized because it still exported armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia despite becoming a member of the ATT in 2019. These rulings in response to these cases show just the continued discrepancy between law and state practice.

The problems of transparency also undermine the system. Several states submit partial ATT reports or to conceal important information and it is hard to trace the magnitude and effects of their weapon transfers. Meanwhile, the UN has documented a high level of diversion in Yemen weapons meant to be used by the state forces have been seized, stolen, or diverted and ended up with militia and extremist groups. This brings out the challenge of providing end-use control in insecure regions.

The Yemen case eventually shows how, due to the absence of regular enforcement, and with political self-interest and ineffective monitoring mechanisms, arms shipments are being used to finance one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world. It highlights the pressing necessity to make the world more accountable and more efficient in providing means of guaranteeing that the sales of legal arms do not contribute to the breach of international law.

### **Guiding Questions:**

1. How can the international community ensure that all states consistently comply with and submit their ATT reports and conduct proper risk assessments?
2. Should there be stronger penalties and consequences for countries that fail to legally follow the procedures of the ATT to promote a safer weapon diversion?
3. How can the global arms trade be regulated to prevent weapons from being used in violations of IHL?
4. Should exporting states be held legally accountable if their weapons are unlawfully used to commit war crimes, and how could this be enforced?
5. Should there be a tracking system to monitor the exchange of weapons between two countries?
6. What roles should international organizations play in detecting and preventing arms diversion?

Part 3

## **Topic B: Emerging Military Technologies & International Humanitarian Law**

### **Current Situation**

With the advent of modern technology, a high degree of contemporary social, economic, and political aspects have experienced profound change, particularly in arms control, global security, and threats to international harmony. The advantages, difficulties, and probable repercussions of developing new technologies in warfare all coexist.

Emerging technologies such as autonomous weapons systems, accompanied by artificial intelligence, serve a pivotal role in fundamentally altering how war is fought and how disputes are handled on the international stage. The ideology of military technologies without direct human input raises ethical and legal questions as the stage is set for a moment of threshold: in what instances does automation positively leverage warfare, and vice versa? The former provides insight into militaries and the development of precise technology: for instance, the latest drones have enabled militaries to carry out strikes in reducing the number of civilian casualties without human input. As for the latter stance, the spread of autonomous weapons may also result in a lack of human oversight and responsibility, raising concerns over heightened conflicts, unforeseen consequences, and violations of the International Humanitarian Law.

Additionally, with the development of linked networks and reliance on digital infrastructure, the emergence of cyberwarfare, artificial intelligence, and directed energy weapons all open new fronts in revolutionizing global conflict.

Cyberwarfare has emerged as a major threat in modern conflict, allowing states and non-state actors to disrupt or breach another nation's vital systems through digital means. Cybersecurity and its use as weaponry have been a major trend in numerous countries, including China, Germany, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Such attacks can spread disinformation, damage critical infrastructure, and expose confidential government data, posing serious risks to national and global security. Cyberwarfare delivers grave risks to lowering the threshold for conflict, as when lethal decisions are delegated to cyber tools, civilian infrastructure stored digitally can experience substantial damage.

## **Current Situation (continued)**

The growth of artificial intelligence (AI) has introduced a system that analyzes vast volumes of data, draws hypothetical predictions, and supports decision-making. However, due to its flexibility, artificial intelligence may also be included in autonomous weaponry, surveillance systems, and defense mechanisms, with such activity reported in France, India, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. For years, international forums, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), have centered discussions on the implications of artificial intelligence, and how its growth and use as weaponry may project future conflicts. While military artificial intelligence is intended to increase precision, efficiency, and reduce risk to personnel and civilians alike, it introduces the “black box nature of AI decision-making.” The “black box” nature refers to the fact that the internal decision-making processes of AI systems are often opaque or obscure to understand. In other words, though the inputs and outputs of artificial intelligence in its military role are visible, the reasoning behind the technology’s conclusion is unclear. This is especially concerning in the military context, where AI may identify a target without clear oversight or proper identification. In such a scenario, the personnel responsible (programmer, commander, or machine) becomes unclear, causing a lack of accountability in society. Therefore, AI’s evolution in warfare is problematic due to its unpredictable actions and unclear accountability. Thus, the exercise of monitoring artificial intelligence is significant in mitigating biased or accidental actions, particularly when the technology is given a role.

Due to their precision, range, and lethality, directed energy weapons (DEWs) such as lasers and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) have become a trend among arms races, particularly among China, France, Germany, India, Russia, Israel, Iran, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Directed energy weapons carry the potential to revolutionize combat. These evolving weapons cripple and obliterate their targets using electromagnetic waves or concentrated energy beams. Although the benefits of DEWs require less logistical support, they pose several problems in warfare. Their high precision and speed make them difficult to defend against, which endangers prolonged conflict. Additionally, the use of DEWs promotes indiscriminate, long-term environmental and health damage to civilians near targets. Additionally, current International Humanitarian Law lacks clear guidelines on the use of DEWs, raising accountability and legal concerns.

Emerging military technologies are increasing in research and development, from cyberwarfare to artificial intelligence and directed energy weapons, presenting unintentional and escalatory acts challenging the International Humanitarian Law, while delivering positive impacts such as enhancing operational efficiency, precision, and the safety of personnel. Negative implications may outweigh positive ones when autonomy is



used as the preliminary weaponry, as its use and opacity to increase weapon speed increase the risk of sudden or unintended harm. This lowers the threshold for conflict and complicates accountability for violations on the world stage, yielding more complicated negotiations and calls to peace. As these tools continue to advance, the international community and DISEC delegates must establish clear regulations, safeguards, and boundaries that preserve human supervision while upholding ethical standards to ensure humanitarian laws remain effective in the modern battlefield.

### **Case Study I: The Kargu-2 Autonomous Drone in the Libyan Conflict**

In the year 2020, United Nations investigators searched and reported that a Turkish-produced Kargu 2 autonomous drone may have attacked by itself, without any direct human involvement, during the Libyan Crisis. The drone, which, upon closer inspection, contains facial recognition systems and loitering capabilities, reportedly identified and pursued fighters that were linked to the Libyan National Army during a retreat.

If verified, this would be one of the first known incidents where a lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS) selected and engaged a target independently. This dilemma raised serious concerns about compliance with International Humanitarian Law, especially regarding the aspects of distinction, proportionality, and the requirement of human oversight and management in the use of force during conflicts.

The incident also highlighted growing concerns about responsibility and accountability. If a system makes a targeting decision by itself, the raised concern of accountability and who takes the blame comes into the picture. This can include the programmer who trained the model and system to complete these tasks, the manufacturer that built the system, the commander that deployed it, or the state that authorized its use.

This event intensified global discussions within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Group of Governmental Experts about the need for regulations on autonomous weapons, and the requirement for conscious human oversight and control.

## **Case Study II: The Stuxnet Cyber Operation Against Iran's Nuclear Facilities**

The Stuxnet worm was a sophisticated and highly developed cyber tool that was discovered in 2010 and widely linked to a covert underground operation by the United States and Israel. Its purpose was to sabotage the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. Stuxnet infiltrated the digital control systems of the centrifuges and caused the system to malfunction while sending false data to Iranian technicians. Because of this, over 1000 of these centrifuges were destroyed. This cyber operation demonstrated that digital attacks can cause physical destruction without the use of traditional weapons. It also blurred the line between sabotage and armed conflict. International Humanitarian Law does not clearly address when a cyber attack or intrusion becomes an armed attack or when it justifies self-defence.

Stuxnet also demonstrated how cyber tools can unintentionally spread beyond their target. The worm eventually appeared in systems across multiple countries. This aftermath raised concerns about the ability of different nations to control the effects of advanced malware and the risks that they pose to global infrastructure and security.

This incident prompted many powerful states such as China, Russia, and the United States to accelerate investments into cyber capabilities, which then contributes to the rapid growth in cyber militarization.

### **Guiding Questions:**

1. How can existing International Humanitarian Law be applied to autonomous weapons systems whose internal decision-making is either opaque or unpredictable?
2. What defines or constitutes meaningful human control, and should DISEC redefine universal standards to maintain security?
3. Should large-scale cyberattacks on critical infrastructure be treated as equivalent to conventional armed attacks under the UN Charter?
4. What mechanisms can we propose as DISEC to ensure transparency, accountability, and traceability of state and non-state actors that are developing emerging military technologies?
5. What safeguards should be required to ensure emerging weapons comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality under International Humanitarian Law?
6. How can we prevent an unregulated arms race in artificial intelligence and directed energy weapons?

## Part 4

# Committee Structure

The Disarmament and International Security Committee, more commonly known as DISEC, is the first committee within the United Nations General Assembly. DISEC was established in 1945, a momentous period when the world grappled with the complexities of disarmament and global security. It channels its efforts toward arms control, conflict resolution, and the preservation of international stability. Amid the charged atmosphere of international relations, the committee shoulders the weighty responsibility of shaping discourse on disarmament while navigating the intricate interplay of nations in their pursuit of security.

Like most General Assemblies, DISEC is a committee that operates on resolutions. The majority of delegates ought to have a solid understanding of the position their nation takes on the issue, as well as the potential resolutions that are discussed during committee meetings. It is up to you to balance the position taken by your country and the interests it pursues while simultaneously pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the issue at hand.

**Although this committee will be tackling two different topics, it is worth noting that they can both be considered under the wide umbrella of the encroaching threat of militarization.**

## Part 5

# Position Papers

For the CSMUN III: DISEC, position papers are **mandatory**. Submitting a position paper would give the dais a better outlook on your country's motivations for their actions in committee, it will **be required** to be eligible for awards. If you decide to write a position paper for this committee, do not exceed 1 page in length with 1-inch margins. This way, I can get a glimpse at your country, the research you have conducted, and the type of delegate you will be in the debate. To learn more about position paper writing, formatting, and submission, please check out the position paper guidelines. We strongly encourage delegates to read through the guidelines carefully as this page will describe content recommendations, formatting requirements, and details on citations. If you have any questions about position paper writing, feel free to contact the dais through [thomascaiz5@crescentschool.org](mailto:thomascaiz5@crescentschool.org), or the secretariat at [modelun@crescentschool.org](mailto:modelun@crescentschool.org).

## Part 6

# Closing Remarks

Despite decades of discussion at the United Nations, issues such as arms diversion, autonomous weapons, cyberwarfare, and space militarization remain deeply challenging. These global problems do not have simple solutions—partly because of geopolitical tensions, strategic interests, and the limitations of existing international law. But this is exactly what makes Model UN meaningful. You, as delegates, have the unique opportunity to imagine approaches that real diplomats have not yet tried, and to explore creative, principled solutions unconstrained by politics or veto power.

If you've made it this far into the background guide, I must commend you because I can say with certainty that most delegates will probably not make that effort. Even so, I hope that delegates take away something from this conference, whether that be a newfound perspective on an age-old conflict or a new friend found in what is essentially an elaborate game of D&D. Whatever you take away from CSMUN, I hope that it impacts your life for the better. Feel free to reach out to me if you have any questions or concerns at [thomascaiz5@crescentschool.org](mailto:thomascaiz5@crescentschool.org)

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